University of Connecticut

OpenCommons@UConn
Connecticut Law Review

School of Law

2015

Do You Know Why I Stopped You: The Future of Traffic Stops in a
Post-Heien World Note
Sarah Ricciardi

Follow this and additional works at: https://opencommons.uconn.edu/law_review

Recommended Citation
Ricciardi, Sarah, "Do You Know Why I Stopped You: The Future of Traffic Stops in a Post-Heien World
Note" (2015). Connecticut Law Review. 287.
https://opencommons.uconn.edu/law_review/287

CONNECTICUT

LAW REVIEW
VOLUME 47

MAY 2015

NUMBER 4

Note
DO YOU KNOW WHY I STOPPED YOU?: THE FUTURE OF
TRAFFIC STOPS IN A POST-HEIEN WORLD
SARAH RICCIARDI

Nearly twenty years after the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision
upholding pretextual traffic stops in Whren v. United States, racial
animosity between white police officers and black civilians is as
pervasive as ever. Reports of unarmed black men killed at the hands
of white law enforcement officers are becoming disturbingly
common. Despite the national outcry against racial discrimination
by law enforcement, the U.S. Supreme Court recently handed down a
decision that will broaden police discretion still further. On
December 15, 2014, the Court in Heien v. North Carolina held that
an officer’s mistake of law can provide the reasonable suspicion
necessary to justify a traffic stop. This Note argues that this
expansion of police discretion will disproportionately affect
minorities, exacerbating the deep mistrust between communities and
their respective police departments.

1075

NOTE CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................. 1077
II. HEIEN V. NORTH CAROLINA ............................................................ 1082
A. FACTUAL BACKGROUND ................................................................... 1082
B. PROCEDURAL POSTURE ..................................................................... 1083
C. RELEVANT LAW ................................................................................ 1084
III. ARGUMENTS .................................................................................... 1086
A. THE “IGNORANCE IS NO EXCUSE” DOCTRINE ................................... 1087
B. “REASONABLENESS” STANDARD ....................................................... 1089
C. PRACTICALITIES ................................................................................ 1090
IV. THE DECISION .................................................................................. 1095
V. RENEWING WHREN:
“DRIVING WHILE BLACK” AFTER HEIEN .................................. 1098
VI. CONCLUSION ................................................................................... 1102

DO YOU KNOW WHY I STOPPED YOU?: THE FUTURE OF
TRAFFIC STOPS IN A POST-HEIEN WORLD
SARAH RICCIARDI
I. INTRODUCTION
Fifty years after the passing of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,1 protests
over racial discrimination are once again front-page news.2 As evidenced
by recent nationwide protests, allegations of racism continue to plague
American streets and courtrooms.3 While overt discrimination has
drastically declined over the last few decades,4 the tension between white
law enforcement officers and minority, indigent civilians is still palpable.
In the past year, there have been two widely publicized incidents in which
an unarmed black man has tragically died at the hands of a white police
officer.5 The deaths of Michael Brown, in Ferguson, Missouri,6 and Eric
Garner, in Staten Island, New York,7 have shaken much of the country.
These deaths are especially jarring in the wake of the 2013 acquittal of


University of Connecticut School of Law, J.D. Candidate 2015; New York University, B.A.
2005. I would like to thank Drew Alan Hillier, Brendan Gooley, Alex Zeman, and the rest of the
Connecticut Law Review staff for their invaluable editorial assistance. I would also like to thank Scott
Garosshen and the Connecticut Moot Court Board for inspiration and guidance.
1
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 outlawed discrimination and segregation on the ground of race,
color, religion, or national origin in places of public accommodation. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241
(1964).
2
See, e.g., J. David Goodman & Al Baker, New York Officer Facing No Charges in Chokehold
Case, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 2014, at A1 (describing protests and demonstrations after a grand jury
decided not to indict the police officer for Eric Garner’s death); Rebecca Davis O’Brien et al., Protests
Erupt After Officer Not Indicted in New York Case, WALL ST. J., Dec. 4, 2014, at A1 (reporting the
“renew[al] . . . of protests that swept the country after another black man was fatally shot by an officer
in Missouri”).
3
See Paula Mejia, Ferguson, Eric Garner Protests Spread Worldwide, NEWSWEEK (Dec. 6, 2014,
12:53
PM),
http://www.newsweek.com/ferguson-eric-garner-protests-sprawl-worldwide-289867
(“[P]rotests[] which demand a focus on civil rights and accountability for police brutality . . . went on
in Oakland, Chicago, Boston, Las Vegas, Los Angeles, Washington D.C. and New Orleans.”).
4
See, e.g., Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2625–28 (2013) (declaring the Section 4
coverage formula of the Voting Rights Act unconstitutional in light of current conditions, specifically
that the “Nation has made great strides” in ending racial discrimination in voting).
5
See O’Brien et al., supra note 2, at A1 (noting that the New York grand jury’s failure to indict
the officer in the Eric Garner case was only “a little more than a week after a grand jury in Missouri
declined to indict a white police officer, Darren Wilson, who shot an unarmed black 18-year old,
Michael Brown, in August”).
6
Id.
7
Deborah E. Bloom & Jareen Imam, New York Man Dies After Chokehold By Police, CNN (DEC.
8, 2014, 5:31 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/07/20/justice/ny-chokehold-death/.
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George Zimmerman, a white neighborhood watch coordinator who shot
and killed an unarmed black teenager in 2012.8
Since the Brown and Garner deaths, protests have erupted across the
U.S.—many of which have escalated into violent riots.9 While there were
demonstrations immediately following the incidents, it was the reaction to
the failed indictments of the officers involved that caused the most
outcry.10 The general sentiment of the protestors appears to be that the
grand juries’ denials are “yet another injustice for blacks.”11 In response to
the frustrations raised by many African Americans with respect to a legal
system with a long history of discrimination against black people,
President Obama acknowledged, “[w]hen anybody in this country is not
being treated equally under the law, that is a problem . . . and it’s my job as
president to help solve it.”12 While President Obama’s promise is
encouraging, it is the judiciary that may be to blame for the ongoing racial
discrimination by police officers.
Just weeks after the failed indictments, the United States Supreme
Court handed down a decision, Heien v. North Carolina,13 that will
potentially broaden police discretion in the context of investigatory traffic
stops. As these types of stops already disproportionately affect minority
drivers,14 this decision will very likely add to the growing tension between
minorities and law enforcement. While the issues facing the grand juries in
8
Lizette Alvarez & Cara Buckley, Zimmerman Is Acquitted in Trayvon Martin Killing, N.Y.
TIMES, July 14, 2013, at A1. As George Zimmerman was a civilian at the time of the shooting, the
Trayvon Martin case is not particularly relevant to this Note’s discussion of actions taken by police
officers. However, it does highlight issues that continue to face minority men when dealing with
authority figures. See, e.g., Devlin Barrett, Holder Criticizes Stand-Your-Ground Laws; Speech
Drawing Link to Teen’s Death Marks Attorney General’s First Rebuke of Such Statutes; Gun-Rights
Groups Rankled, WALL ST. J. ONLINE (July 16, 2013), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001
424127887324348504578610113097977142 (reporting that after Martin’s death last year, Eric Holder,
the nation’s first black attorney general, “sat down with his 15-year-old son and discussed how to
respond if he were stopped by police, just as his own father had done with him decades earlier,” and
noting that “[t]his was a father-son tradition [he] hoped would not need to be handed down”).
9
See Monica Davey & Julie Bosman, Grand Jury Declines to Indict Police Officer in Ferguson
Killing, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25, 2014, at A1 (“Bottles and rocks were thrown at officers, and windows of
businesses were smashed. Several police cars were burned; buildings . . . were on fire, and looting was
reported in several businesses. Gunshots could be heard along the streets of Ferguson, and law
enforcement authorities deployed smoke and gas to control the crowds.”).
10
Id.; Goodman & Baker, supra note 2, at A1.
11
Jack Healy, Ferguson, Still Tense, Grows Calmer, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 2014, at A24. Indeed,
the slogan “black lives matter,” which was originally created in 2012 after the acquittal of George
Zimmerman, has been revived as the motto against racial inequality. Mejia, supra note 3.
12
Goodman & Baker, supra note 2, at A1.
13
135 S. Ct. 530 (2014).
14
According to a 2011 survey published by the Justice Department, black drivers are 31 percent
more likely to be pulled over than white drivers, and about 23 percent more likely than Hispanic
drivers. See LYNN LANGTON & MATTHEW DUROSE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, POLICE BEHAVIOR DURING TRAFFIC AND STREET STOPS, 2011 1 (2013) (reporting that 13% of
drivers who were pulled over in a traffic stop were black, 10% were white, and 10% were Hispanic).
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the Brown and Garner incidents and the Supreme Court in Heien were
factually and legally different,15 the cases share common questions. What
were the police officer’s subjective intentions at the time? Does it matter?
And should it matter?
The difficulty in answering these questions lies in the fact that courts
have yet to achieve omniscience. What is truly on the minds of parties
involved in lawsuits remains unknown. Did the supermarket owner know
about the spill and choose not to clean it up?16 Did the taxpayer really not
know that his wages were considered income under the Tax Code?17 Did
the officer actually stop the car with discriminatory intent?18 Did the
defendant truly fear for his life?19 In response, the legal system has done its
best to create mechanisms to determine when and how the state of mind of
an individual should be considered.
For example, negligence was created to “coordinate conduct within [a]
community safely.”20 Communities adopt rules and practices that give
members guidance as to how to act in certain situations.21 With these preexisting social conventions in place, it does not matter whether an
individual actually knew he was committing a violation.22 Under the law of

15
The Garner and Brown cases involved officers being charged with manslaughter, among other
things. Rich Calder & Selim Algar, ‘Reckless’ Omission in Garner Case, N.Y. POST, Dec. 6, 2014, at 4;
Julie Bosman et al., Amid Conflicting Accounts, Trusting the Officer, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26, 2014, at
A1. Both were decided at the indictment stage. Bosman et al., supra note 15, at A1.; Calder & Algar,
supra note 15, at 4. The Heien case dealt with the reasonable suspicion standard as it pertains to traffic
stops. Heien, 135 S. Ct. at 534. The judgment up for appeal was over the suppression of evidence
obtained from a search following the stop. Id. at 535.
16
See, e.g., Negri v. Stop & Shop, Inc., 480 N.E.2d 740, 741 (N.Y. 1985) (holding that a grocery
store owner may be liable if he has constructive notice of a dangerous condition, regardless of whether
he actually knew about it or not).
17
See, e.g., Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 201 (1991) (noting that criminal tax liability
requires willfulness, i.e., that “the defendant knew of the duty purportedly imposed by the provision of
the statute or regulation he is accused of violating”).
18
See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (holding that “the constitutional
reasonableness of traffic stops [does not] depend[] on the actual motivations of the individual officers
involved”); infra Part V (discussing police officer motivations during traffic stops).
19
See, e.g., United States v. Wagner, 834 F.2d 1474, 1486 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that defendant
was not entitled to instruction on self-defense because the victim’s “alleged attempt to grab the hot
water pitcher did not justify [the defendant’s act of] pulling a knife after all danger had passed”); see
also Alvarez & Buckley, supra note 8, at A1 (reporting that the six-woman jury acquitted George
Zimmerman of the killing of Trayvon Martin in Florida, where self-defense laws “allow someone with
a reasonable fear of great bodily harm or death to use lethal force, even if retreating from danger is an
option”).
20
Patrick J. Kelley, Restating Duty, Breach, and Proximate Cause in Negligence Law:
Descriptive Theory and the Rule of Law, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1039, 1063 (2001).
21
Id. at 1064.
22
See id. (noting that cases are decided based on the “pre-existing social convention[s]” within
the community).
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23

negligence, he simply should have known.
The rule against hearsay24 (and its exceptions) is another mechanism
employed to deal with the unreachable subjective mind of individuals.
Generally, hearsay is inadmissible because of an inherent lack of
trustworthiness.25 But in certain situations, courts may overlook that
untrustworthiness.26 For example, Federal Rule of Evidence 803(1), the
“present sense impression” exception, allows into evidence a “statement
describing or explaining an event or condition, made while or immediately
after the declarant perceived it.”27 According to the Advisory Committee’s
Note, the rationale for such an exception is that if a statement describing an
event is made near the time of the event, it negates “the likelihood of
deliberate or conscious misrepresentation.”28 Even though it is entirely
possible that the declarant was lying when he made the statement, because
he made it near the time of the event, courts presume it was true.29
Naturally, society’s attempts to deal with subjectivity often create
inconsistencies in its treatment by the law. Such inconsistencies are
23
See, e.g., Trimarco v. Klein, 436 N.E.2d 502, 505 (N.Y. 1982) (noting “the well-recognized and
pragmatic proposition that when ‘certain dangers have been removed by a customary way of doing
things safely, this custom may be proved to show that [the one charged with the dereliction] has fallen
below the required standard’”) (citation omitted).
24
Hearsay is an out-of-court statement offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. FED. R.
EVID. 801(c).
25
See James Donald Moorehead, Compromising the Hearsay Rule: The Fallacy of Res Gestae
Reliability, 29 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 203, 246 (1995) (“[The hearsay rule] protects against the errant or
fabricated statements of remote declarants and in-court witnesses, and it helps to ensure that the jury
does not base its decision on untested hearsay. Because the declarant is not subject to crossexamination, there must be additional guarantors of trustworthiness to take its place before hearsay
should be admitted.”); see also United States v. Boyce, 742 F.3d 792, 800 (7th Cir. 2014) (Posner, J.,
concurring) (noting that hearsay is often “no better than rumor or gossip”).
26
Boyce, 742 F.3d at 800 (Posner, J., concurring) (discussing exceptions to the rule against
hearsay).
27
FED. R. EVID. 803(1). Though codified by the Rules of Evidence, many of these exceptions are
the result of “folk psychology.” See Lust v. Sealy, Inc., 383 F.3d 580, 588 (7th Cir. 2004) (critiquing
the rationale behind the present sense impression exception); see also Boyce, 742 F.3d at 801 (Posner,
J., concurring) (noting that the present sense impression “has neither a theoretical nor an empirical
basis; and it’s not even common sense—it’s not even good folk psychology”).
28
FED. R. EVID. 801 advisory committee’s note.
29
Boyce, 742 F.3d at 800 (Posner, J., concurring). Judge Posner strongly criticized this rationale
in his concurring opinion in Boyce.

Even real immediacy is not a guarantor of truthfulness. It’s not true that people can’t
make up a lie in a short period of time. Most lies in fact are
spontaneous. . . . Suppose I run into an acquaintance on the street and he has a new
dog with him—a little yappy thing—and he asks me, “Isn’t he beautiful?” I answer
yes, though I’m a cat person and consider his dog hideous.
Id. Posner went on to similarly criticize the “excited utterance” exception, noting that “even if a person
is so excited by something that he loses the capacity for reflection (which doubtless does happen), how
can there be any confidence that his unreflective utterance, provoked by excitement, is reliable?” Id. at
801.
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particularly glaring with respect to cases involving law enforcement. The
arguments presented in Heien specifically contemplated the difference
between how courts treat the state of mind of a civilian defendant and the
state of mind of a law enforcement officer. The question before the Heien
Court was whether an officer’s mistake of law could provide reasonable
suspicion to justify a traffic stop.30 At first blush, the question seems easily
answerable. Fourth Amendment precedent suggests that police officers
may make mistakes as long as their actions are reasonable under the
circumstances.31 As Petitioner Nicholas Brady Heien contended, however,
there is a strong argument that mistakes of law should be considered per se
unreasonable and therefore a violation of the Fourth Amendment. Indeed,
eight circuits have ruled that mistakes of law generally cannot provide the
basis for reasonable suspicion.32
Using Heien as a guidepost, this Note will analyze the treatment of a
police officer’s state of mind in the context of Fourth Amendment
violations. Part II will provide a factual context for the forthcoming legal
analysis by describing the relevant facts of Heien. Part III will discuss
various arguments posed by both parties. In particular, it will address
Heien’s contention that the “ignorance is no excuse” doctrine suggests that
a police officer should be required to know the law as well as a civilian. It
will also discuss the Court’s previous treatment of a police officer’s state
of mind in the context of the Fourth Amendment, specifically addressing
cases involving mistakes of fact. Part IV will discuss the Supreme Court’s
opinion and the potential implications of its ruling in light of the civil
unrest surrounding the failed indictments in Ferguson and Staten Island.
This Note will conclude by suggesting that the Supreme Court’s sanction
of an expansion of police discretion will disproportionately affect
minorities and will likely fan the fire of public outrage.

30

Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530, 534 (2014).
See, e.g., Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 185–86 (1990) (noting that factual determinations
made by law enforcement officers need only be reasonable, not correct).
32
See State v. Heien, 737 S.E.2d 351, 360 (N.C. 2012) [hereinafter Heien II] (Hudson, J.,
dissenting) (accumulating circuit case law). Specifically:
31

The First, Third, Fifth, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits all apply
some form of the rule that an officer’s mistake of law cannot be the basis for
reasonable suspicion, though many allow that a stop based on a mistake of law may
be constitutional if it can be justified objectively notwithstanding the mistake of law.
Id. (citing United States v. Debruhl, 38 A.3d 293, 299 (D.C. Cir. 2012); United States v. Coplin, 463
F.3d 96, 101 (1st Cir. 2006); United States v. Mosley, 454 F.3d 249, 260 n.16 (3d Cir. 2006); United
States v. McDonald, 453 F.3d 958, 961 (7th Cir. 2006); United States v. Tibbetts, 396 F.3d 1132, 1138
(10th Cir. 2005); United States v. Chanthasouxat, 342 F.3d 1271, 1279 (11th Cir. 2003); United States
v. Lopez-Soto, 205 F.3d 1101, 1106 (9th Cir. 2000); United States v. Miller, 146 F.3d 274, 279 (5th
Cir. 1998)).
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II. HEIEN V. NORTH CAROLINA
A. Factual Background
On the morning of April 29, 2009, Petitioner Nicholas Brady Heien
and Maynor Javier Vasquez were traveling along Interstate 77 through
Surry County, North Carolina.33 Vasquez was driving Heien’s car, a Ford
Escort, while Heien lay across the back seat.34 At that time, Sergeant Matt
Darisse of the Surry County Sheriff’s Department was working criminal
interdiction, observing traffic on the same interstate.35 At the time of the
traffic stop in question, Sergeant Darisse had worked in Surry County law
enforcement for twenty years, the last two of which he spent doing
criminal interdiction.36
When the Escort approached, it appeared to Sergeant Darisse that
Vasquez was “stiff and nervous” so he decided to follow the vehicle.37 As
traffic slowed, Sergeant Darisse noticed that the vehicle’s left rear brake
light illuminated but the right rear brake light did not.38 Sergeant Darisse
activated his blue lights and stopped the vehicle.39 Darisse informed
Vasquez that he had stopped the vehicle due to a faulty brake light.40
Unbeknownst to Sergeant Darisse, North Carolina law required vehicles to
have only one functioning brake light.41 At the time of the stop, no North
Carolina appellate court had interpreted the statute one way or the other.42
Sergeant Darisse simply assumed that the law required two functioning
brake lights.43
After finding no problems with Vasquez’s license and registration,
Sergeant Darisse issued Vasquez a warning ticket for the malfunctioning
brake light.44 Sergeant Darisse then asked Vasquez some additional
questions, including whether he could search the vehicle.45 Vasquez
33
Joint Appendix at 4, Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530 (2014) (No. 13–604) [hereinafter
Joint Appendix].
34
Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530, 534 (2014).
35
Id.
36
Joint Appendix, supra note 33, at 14.
37
Brief for Petitioner at 2, Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530 (2014) (No. 13–604)
[hereinafter Brief for Petitioner].
38
Id.
39
Id.
40
Id. at 3.
41
State v. Heien, 714 S.E.2d 827, 829 (N.C. Ct. App. 2011) [hereinafter Heien I]; see also Heien
v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530, 535 (2014) (“Noting that the State had chosen not to seek review of
the Court of Appeals’ interpretation of the vehicle code, the North Carolina Supreme Court
assumed . . . that the faulty brake light was not a violation.”).
42
Heien, 135 S. Ct. at 540 (citing Heien II, 737 S.E.2d at 359).
43
Id. at 534.
44
Id.
45
Id.
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responded that he did not mind but that it was not his car. Sergeant
Darisse then asked Heien, who verbally consented to the search.47 The
search of the vehicle revealed a sandwich bag filled with cocaine.48
B. Procedural Posture
On September 24, 2009, the State of North Carolina charged Heien
with attempted cocaine trafficking.49 Contending that the initial traffic stop
violated the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable searches
and seizures, Heien moved to suppress the evidence obtained during the
search of his vehicle.50 On March 25, 2010, the trial court denied Heien’s
motion to suppress.51 In making its ruling, the court assumed that North
Carolina law required two functioning brake lights.52 Heien pled guilty to
attempted cocaine trafficking, but reserved the right to appeal the court’s
denial of his motion to suppress.53 He was sentenced to two consecutive
ten-to-twelve month prison terms.54
On August 16, 2011, the North Carolina Court of Appeals reversed the
trial court’s decision and vacated the conviction, holding that Sergeant
Darisse “could not have had a reasonable, articulable suspicion that the
malfunctioning brake light constituted a violation of [North Carolina law]”
because North Carolina General Statute Section 20-129 required only one
functioning brake light and no other statute applied.55 The State appealed
to the North Carolina Supreme Court, conceding the Court of Appeals’
interpretation of Section 20-129 but arguing that the traffic stop still did
not violate the Fourth Amendment because an objectively reasonable
mistake of law can provide reasonable suspicion.56
Thus, the North Carolina Supreme Court reviewed the case under the
assumption that the law required only one functioning brake light.57 The
North Carolina Supreme Court reversed, remanding the case back to the
Court of Appeals to decide whether Heien’s consent to search his car was
invalid.58 Both the North Carolina Court of Appeals and the North Carolina
46

Id.
Id.
48
Id.
49
Joint Appendix, supra note 33, at 1.
50
Heien, 135 S. Ct. at 535.
51
Joint Appendix, supra note 33, at 1.
52
Heien, 135 S. Ct. at 535 (noting that the trial court did not decide whether two lights were
required).
53
Id.
54
Heien I, 714 S.E.2d 827, 827 (N.C. Ct. App. 2011) .
55
Id. at 831.
56
Heien II, 737 S.E.2d 351, 354 (N.C. 2012) .
57
Heien, 135 S. Ct. at 535.
58
Id.
47
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Supreme Court held that Heien’s consent was valid. Heien abandoned the
consent issue and petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for certiorari. On
April 21, 2014, the Supreme Court granted review of the question:
“Whether a police officer’s mistake of law can provide the individualized
suspicion that the Fourth Amendment requires to justify a traffic stop.”60
C. Relevant Law
The Supreme Court has continually recognized that “[n]o right is held
more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the common law, than the
right of every individual to the possession and control of his own person,
free from all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and
unquestionable authority of law.”61 The Fourth Amendment to the United
States Constitution provides in relevant part: “The right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated.”62 The Fourteenth Amendment
makes this protection applicable to the states.63
To preserve these constitutional protections, the Supreme Court
established standards by which police officers must abide. Ordinarily, an
arrest requires both: (i) probable cause to believe that the person
committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime; and (ii) either a
warrant or exigent circumstances requiring immediate action before a
warrant could be obtained.64 But for a brief investigatory stop, a police
officer needs only a reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal
activity.65 In those cases, “[a] police officer must be able to point to
specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences
from those facts, reasonably warrant [an] intrusion.”66
“Temporary detention of individuals during the stop of an automobile
by the police . . . constitutes a ‘seizure’ of ‘persons’ within the meaning of
[the Fourth Amendment].”67 As such, a traffic stop is “subject to the
constitutional imperative that it not be ‘unreasonable’ under the
circumstances”68 and is valid only if the officers have an objectively
reasonable suspicion to believe that a law is being violated.69 Thus, a
traffic stop without probable cause or reasonable suspicion is a violation of
59

Id.
Brief for Petitioner, supra note 37, at i.
61
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968) (citation omitted).
62
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
63
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).
64
Terry, 392 U.S. at 20.
65
Id. at 20–21.
66
Id. at 21.
67
Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809–10 (1996).
68
Id. at 810.
69
Terry, 392 U.S. at 20–21.
60
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the Fourth Amendment.
Any evidence obtained thereafter is excluded as fruit of the poisonous
tree unless it is sufficiently attenuated from that violation or subject to an
exception.70 The good-faith exception provides that suppression is not
appropriate when police officers act with “an objectively reasonable goodfaith belief that their conduct is lawful.”71
In North Carolina, motor vehicles must have at least one functioning
rear brake light.72 Section 20-129(d) of the North Carolina General Statutes
provides in relevant part: “Rear Lamps.—Every motor vehicle . . . shall
have all originally equipped rear lamps or the equivalent in good working
order . . . .”73 Subsection (g) provides:
No person shall sell or operate on the highways of the State
any motor vehicle, motorcycle or motor-driven cycle,
manufactured after December 31, 1955, unless it shall be
equipped with a stop lamp on the rear of the vehicle. The
stop lamp shall display a red or amber light visible from a
distance of not less than 100 feet to the rear in normal
sunlight, and shall be actuated upon application of the service
(foot) brake. The stop lamp may be incorporated into a unit
with one or more other rear lamps.74
In addition, North Carolina General Statute Section 20-183.3(a)
provides:
Safety.—A safety inspection of a motor vehicle consists of
an inspection of the following equipment to determine if the
vehicle has the equipment required by . . . this Chapter and if
the equipment is in a safe operating condition: . . . (2) Lights,
as required by [Section 20-129].75

70
See, e.g., United States v. Chanthasouxat, 342 F.3d 1271, 1280–81 (11th Cir. 2003) (holding
that the trial court erred in admitting evidence obtained following an unlawful traffic stop).
71
Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2427 (2011) (internal quotation marks omitted).
72
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 20-129(d), (g) (2009).
73
Id. § 20-128(d) (emphasis added).
74
Id. § 20-128(g) (emphasis added).
75
Id. § 20-183.3(a).
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III. ARGUMENTS
Due to a divergence of state and federal law, Heien’s position before
the Supreme Court appears counterintuitive. Typically, the end goal of an
appeal of a denial of a motion to suppress is for the higher court to hold
that there was a reversible error—i.e., the case is remanded back to the trial
court for proceedings consistent with the higher court’s opinion.76 In this
case, however, Heien sought a clarification of federal law so that, when his
case was remanded back to state court, he would receive a state remedy in
light of the clarified federal law.77
Federal courts (and many state courts) apply a “good-faith exception”
in cases where evidence was obtained in violation of the Fourth
Amendment but there was no flagrant police misconduct.78 Under the
good-faith exception, wrongfully obtained evidence that would normally
be suppressed is admitted.79 In this particular case, there was no allegation
of misconduct on the part of Officer Darisse.80 Even if the Supreme Court
were to find that there was a violation of the Fourth Amendment, the
evidence would still be admitted under federal law.
However, at the time the charges were filed against Heien, North
Carolina did not recognize a good-faith exception.81 Heien thus had to
argue that the “reasonableness” of mistakes of law should be limited to the
remedy issue in preparation for the case’s remand to the North Carolina
Supreme Court.82 Rather than seek a judgment on the exclusion of the
evidence, Heien asked the U.S. Supreme Court to limit its analysis to the
issue of whether there was a Fourth Amendment violation in the first
place.83 Given that agenda, the main thrust behind Heien’s argument was
76
See, e.g., Florence v. State, 670 So. 2d 135, 136 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (concluding that it
was error to deny the motion to suppress, reversing and remanding).
77
Heien II, 737 S.E.2d 351, 361 (N.C. 2012) (Hudson, J., dissenting).
78
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 911 (1984) (noting that “an assessment of the flagrancy of
the police misconduct constitutes an important step in the calculus”).
79
Id.
80
Brief for the Respondent at 38, Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530 (2014) (No. 13-604)
[hereinafter Brief for the Respondent].
81
See State v. Carter, 370 S.E.2d 553, 562 (N.C. 1988) (“We are not persuaded on the facts
before us that we should engraft a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule under our state
constitution.”). In 2011, the General Assembly indicated that the North Carolina Supreme Court revisit
Carter by enacting a statutory “good faith exception.” N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A–974 (2011).
82
Brief for Petitioner, supra note 37, at 29–33.
83
Id. During oral argument, Justice Scalia made it pretty clear that the Court was not buying the
argument:

[W]e don’t review opinions. We review judgments, we review results. What you’re
complaining about here is the admission of what was discovered in the search of the
car, right? Now, what difference does it make whether that was lawfully admitted
because it was a constitutional search or it was lawfully admitted because the
remedy of excluding it would not be applied if there was a mistake of law . . . ? We
don’t review analyses. We review judgments. You’re – you’re urging that this
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that all mistakes of law are per se violations of the Fourth Amendment.
North Carolina countered with Justice Ginsburg’s famous proposition
that the “touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness.”85 The
State argued that bifurcating the analysis was unnecessary.86 As long as
police officers act reasonably, evidence obtained via a search or seizure
should not be excluded.87 While it seems as though Heien had an uphill
battle, there are legitimate reasons as to why allowing mistakes of law
would be unwise in light of the nation’s current climate. The following
sections discuss some of the issues the Court faced in Heien.
A. The “Ignorance Is No Excuse” Doctrine
One of the more facially attractive arguments raised by Heien was
based on the premise that law enforcement officers should be required to
know the law at least as well as civilians. Common law has long
recognized that officers are responsible for knowing the correct
interpretation of the law. Prior to the adoption of the exclusionary rule,
Fourth Amendment violations were enforced under tort law.88 At common
law, officers were held liable for mistakes of law regardless of
reasonableness.89 Today, there is a presumption that law enforcement
officers know the law. It is their job to identify infractions and to take
proper action.
Our justice system holds civilians to that same standard. “[T]he
background presumption [is] that every citizen knows the law . . . .”90
Accordingly, the “traditional rule” is that “ignorance of the law is no
excuse.”91 It is not only unfair but also illogical to hold civilians to a higher
conviction has to be set aside. That’s what we’re reviewing, the conviction, not the
opinion.
Transcript of Oral Argument at 12–13, 20–21, Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530 (2014) (No. 13604).
84
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 83, at 12–23.
85
Brief for the Respondent, supra note 80, at 11 (citing United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112,
118 (2001)).
86
Id. at 26, 27–30. Further, Heien’s focus on per se violations does little to simplify the analysis
of mistakes of law. Rather than eliminate the reasonableness inquiry altogether, Heien simply imports
the reasonableness inquiry into the remedial analysis. Moreover, Heien’s approach adds an additional
step of analysis to determine whether the mistake was indeed of law or fact. With no administrative
benefit to justify it, Heien’s approach is a poor substitute for the longstanding tradition of evaluating
reasonableness in one succinct inquiry.
87
Id. at 26–30.
88
See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 670 (1961) (Douglas, J., concurring) (stating a tort cause of
action may be applied in a Fourth Amendment situation).
89
See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 121 cmt. i (2014) (“[A]n officer is not privileged to
arrest another whom he reasonably suspects of having committed an act which the officer, through a
mistake of law reasonable in one of his position, believes to be a common law felony.”).
90
Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184, 193 (1998).
91
Id. at 196.
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standard than law enforcement officers. To permit mistakes of law to
justify traffic stops is to say that a police officer, when driving as a citizen,
has a duty to know every nuance of the traffic code, but the instant he dons
his badge he has no such responsibility.
While this argument has what the Supreme Court described as a
“rhetorical appeal,”93 the “ignorance is no excuse” doctrine does not reach
as far as Heien suggests. The maxim “ignorance of the law is no excuse” is
a legal doctrine that ensures uniformity in criminal prosecution.94
However, as North Carolina pointed out, it is “subject to numerous
exceptions and qualifications.”95 Many crimes require some form of intent.
For example, “willfulness,” which includes an element of knowledge, is
often a requirement for tax convictions.96
Heien’s argument further ignores a fundamental distinction between
determining reasonable suspicion in the field versus assessing criminal
liability in a courtroom.97 The ignorance-of-the-law doctrine serves as a
litigation tool, aiding in the prosecution of criminals. There is no need for
such a tool outside the courtroom. At the inception of a traffic stop,
ultimate criminal liability is not the issue.
As the Supreme Court ultimately explained, “[j]ust as an individual
generally cannot escape criminal liability based on a mistaken
understanding of the law, so too the government cannot impose criminal
liability based on a mistaken understanding of the law.”98 Had the law
required two functioning brake lights, Heien could not have been relieved
of liability by claiming ignorance, and similarly, had the law required only
one brake light, Officer Darisse could not have issued a ticket because he
reasonably thought the law required two. The Court concluded that “[j]ust
because mistakes of law cannot justify either the imposition or the
avoidance of criminal liability, it does not follow that they cannot justify

92
Brief for Petitioner, supra note 37, at 17–18 (“It takes little reflection to see the ‘fundamental
unfairness’ of holding citizens to that maxim ‘while allowing those entrusted to enforce the law to be
ignorant of it.’” (quoting United States v. Chanthasouxat, 342 F.3d 1271, 1280 (11th Cir. 2003))).
Indeed, “failure to understand the law by the very person charged with enforcing it is not objectively
reasonable.” Id. at 18 (quoting United States v. Tibbetts, 396 F.3d 1132, 1138 (10th Cir. 2005) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
93
Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530, 540 (2014).
94
Arthur Leavens, Beyond Blame—Mens Rea and Regulatory Crime, 46 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV.
1, 21 (2007).
95
Brief for the Respondent, supra note 80, at 23 (internal quotation marks omitted).
96
See, e.g., Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 201 (1991) (noting that criminal tax liability
requires willfulness, i.e., that “the defendant knew of the duty purportedly imposed by the provision of
the statute or regulation he is accused of violating”).
97
Brief for the Respondent, supra note 80, at 24 (noting that Heien “confuses the crime that
prompted the initial stop and the crime of arrest”).
98
Heien, 135 S. Ct. at 540; Brief for the Respondent, supra note 80, at 24.
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an investigatory stop.” However, this reasoning does not contribute much
to answer the question of why mistakes of law should justify an
investigatory stop at all.
B. “Reasonableness” Standard
North Carolina’s position was essentially that a traffic stop is justified
even if a police officer makes a mistake of law as long as it is a reasonable
one. As previously noted, “[t]he touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is
reasonableness . . . .”100 The Fourth Amendment’s purpose “is to impose a
standard of ‘reasonableness’ upon the exercise of discretion by government
officials, including law enforcement agents in order ‘to safeguard the
privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions.’”101 Courts
recognize that the reasonableness standard is a “fluid concept” that applies
to the analysis of all potential Fourth Amendment violations.102 Rather than
delineate bright line rules to distinguish between reasonable and
unreasonable behavior, the Supreme Court has held that “[e]ach case is to
be decided on its own facts and circumstances.”103 Reasonable suspicion
cannot be “reduced to a neat set of legal rules” for it is a “commonsense,
nontechnical conception[] that deal[s] with the factual and practical
considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not
legal technicians, act.”104 Thus, reasonable suspicion requires only “some
minimal level of objective justification.”105 Sergeant Darisse’s objective
99
Heien, 135 S. Ct. at 540. Importantly, Heien’s appeal was not a challenge of a traffic ticket –
rather it was a challenge of the validity of the initial traffic stop. Id. Heien made a similar argument, in
which he conflated criminal liability and reasonable suspicion, with respect to the rule of lenity. Brief
for Petitioner, supra note 37, at 18. Essentially, he claimed that if any ambiguity existed with respect to
the traffic code, it should have been construed in such a way as to limit the interference with personal
liberty. Id. If the general rule is that legislatures cannot draft ambiguous criminal statutes and any
ambiguity should be construed in favor of lenity, then charges resulting from an officer’s finding of
reasonable suspicion based on an ambiguous law should also be resolved in favor of lenity. Id.
However, like the ignorance-of-the-law doctrine, this particular legal mechanism applies to criminal
liability with respect to the crime charged. See Brief for the Respondent, supra note 80, at 25 (“The
rule of lenity and related canons could have affected how the North Carolina courts interpreted the
state’s brake light provision. But that was not the offense for which petitioner was held criminally
liable.”). Had Heien been tried for insufficient brake lights, the rule of lenity may have provided him a
defense by arguing that the traffic law was unclear or ambiguous. Id. at 24–25. When an officer stops a
vehicle based on his reasonable mistake in interpreting an ambiguous law, the driver is not subject to
liability pursuant to the ambiguous law or the officer’s interpretation of it. Id. at 24. Here, Heien was
charged with cocaine possession and trafficking under a clear statute—not a malfunctioning brake light
under an ambiguous one.
100
United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118 (2001).
101
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653–54 (1979) (citing Marshall v. Barlow’s Inc., 436 U.S.
307, 312 (1978) (emphasis added)).
102
Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696 (1996).
103
Id. (citation omitted)
104
Id. at 695–96 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
105
United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989) (citation omitted).
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justification was a reasonable interpretation of an unclear traffic code.
However, as Heien points out, under the Fourth Amendment, an
investigatory stop is permissible only if supported by reasonable suspicion
of criminal activity.106 By logical extension, a traffic stop based on
suspicion of conduct that is not actually criminal is by its very nature
unreasonable. Fourth Amendment jurisprudence requires that, when
determining whether reasonable suspicion exists, the facts known to the
officer must be measured against the correct interpretation of the law. The
reasonable suspicion standard implicated by a law enforcement officer’s
investigatory stop represents a balance between “the need to search (or
seize) [and] the invasion which the search (or seizure) entails.”107 The
Supreme Court described reasonable suspicion as “a particularized and
objective basis for suspecting the person stopped of criminal activity.”108
Without such criminal activity, reasonable suspicion cannot exist.
Whether reasonable suspicion exists turns on “whether the rule of law
as applied to the established facts is or is not violated.”109 The
determination is simple: “either the law was violated and the stop is
reasonable, or the law was not violated and the stop is not reasonable.”110
Indeed, “[w]hat matters . . . are the facts as viewed by an objectively
reasonable officer, and the rule of law—not an officer’s conception of the
rule of law, and not even an officer’s reasonable misunderstanding about
the law, but the law.”111 It is undisputed that North Carolina law only
requires one functioning rear brake light and that Sergeant Darisse initiated
the traffic stop upon observing “the right brake light of the vehicle
not . . . function[ing].”112 With no law broken, Sergeant Darisse had no
legal authority to warrant an intrusion on Heien’s constitutional rights.
C. Practicalities
In addition to finding support in the text of the Fourth Amendment,
North Carolina was also quick to point out the practical benefits of
applying a fluid standard to evaluate police conduct. The reasonableness
standard allows law enforcement officers to make determinations based on
the circumstances in front of them without requiring them to be
omniscient. As the North Carolina Supreme Court recognized, “[t]o require
our law enforcement officers to accurately forecast how a reviewing court
will interpret the substantive law at issue would transform this
106

Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 693, 696.
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968) (citation omitted).
108
Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 696 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
109
Id. at 697 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
110
Heien II, 737 S.E.2d 351, 360 (N.C. 2012) (Hudson, J., dissenting).
111
Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530, 542 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
112
Heien II, 737 S.E.2d at 353.
107
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commonsense, nontechnical conception into something that requires much
more than some minimal level of objective justification.”113
Indeed, “[t]he Supreme Court of the United States does not demand
factual accuracy from our police when determining whether reasonable
suspicion exists.”114 To satisfy this standard “what is generally demanded
of the many factual determinations that must regularly be made by agents
of the government . . . is not that they always be correct, but that they
always be reasonable.”115 Thus, courts universally uphold searches and
seizures based on reasonable mistakes of fact.116
Similarly, courts have long refused to punish officers for reasonably
relying on the flawed judgment of others. In the English case Carratt v.
Morley,117 the court held that an officer was liable for false imprisonment
where he seized the plaintiff under a facially void warrant.118 But the court
observed that had the warrant been “even substantially good” in form,
though still invalid, it would have provided the officer a defense.119 Today,
evidence obtained as a result of officers’ reasonable, but mistaken, reliance
on third-party judgments is generally admissible.120 Most recently, in
Michigan v. DeFillippo,121 the Court declined to suppress evidence that
was obtained pursuant to a subsequently invalidated ordinance.122 In that
113
Id. at 357 (internal quotation marks omitted). See, e.g., Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31,
37–38 (1979) (“A prudent officer, in the course of determining whether respondent had committed an
offense under all the circumstances shown by this record, should not have been required to anticipate
that a court would later hold the [violated] ordinance unconstitutional.”); United States v. Martin, 411
F.3d 998, 1001 (8th Cir. 2005) (“We should not expect state highway patrolmen to interpret the traffic
laws with the subtlety and expertise of a criminal defense attorney.” (citation omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
114
Heien II, 737 S.E.2d at 358.
115
Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 185–86 (1990); see United States v. Chanthasouxat, 342
F.3d 1271, 1276 (11th Cir. 2003) (“A traffic stop based on an officer’s incorrect but reasonable
assessment of facts does not violate the Fourth Amendment.”).
116
See, e.g., United States v. Lang, 81 F.3d 955, 966 (10th Cir. 1996) (holding that an officer’s
mistake of identity was reasonable under the circumstances); United States v. Hatley, 15 F.3d 856, 859
(9th Cir. 1994) (holding that, for the purposes of the vehicle exception, it was reasonable for officers to
believe that a particular car was mobile in light of the circumstances); United States v. Gonzalez, 969
F.2d 999, 1005 (11th Cir. 1992) (holding that an officer’s mistake of identity could be reasonable under
the circumstance).
117
113 Eng. Rep. 1036 (1841).
118
Id. at 1040.
119
Id.
120
See, e.g., Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2434 (2011) (affirming denial of a motion to
suppress when an officer reasonably relied on subsequently overturned appellate precedent); Illinois v.
Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 359–61 (1987) (refusing to apply the exclusionary rule where an officer
reasonably relied on a statute that was subsequently held unconstitutional); United States v. Leon, 468
U.S. 897, 926 (1984) (declining exclusion where an officer reasonably relied on a magistrate’s
incorrect determination of probable cause); Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 40 (1979) (declining
exclusion where an officer reasonably relied on an ordinance later held unconstitutional).
121
443 U.S. 31 (1979).
122
Id. at 40.

1092

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47:1075
123

case, an officer searched an individual incident to an arrest. However,
the law that the individual allegedly violated (leading to the arrest) was
later found to be unconstitutional.124 Nonetheless, the Supreme Court
concluded that the search was not unlawful because “the officer’s
assumption that the law was valid was reasonable.”125 The Court reasoned
that “there was no controlling precedent that [the] ordinance was or was
not constitutional, and hence the conduct observed violated a
presumptively valid ordinance.”126
Police officers are faced with difficult conditions every day, many of
which arise with little to no warning. Mistakes of fact are tolerated because
of these ambiguous and often dangerous situations.127 For officers to
ensure the public’s safety and enforce the law, they must act quickly and
decisively. They must assess unfolding situations in real-time, without the
benefit of unlimited time and resources.
It is unrealistic to assume that an officer will be able to clarify his
interpretation of a law while in the field. This is especially true when the
particular law at issue is complicated, ambiguous, or unsettled. When
considering whether to pull over a suspect who zooms by on the highway,
an officer cannot be expected to first consult an attorney or other “legal
technician”128 to verify that the suspect did indeed commit a traffic
violation.129
In light of the “rapidly unfolding and often dangerous situations on city
streets,” officers need a certain amount of discretion to allow them to take
“necessarily swift action predicated upon . . . on-the-spot observations.”130
Thus, great deference is given to the judgment of trained law enforcement
123

Id. at 33–35.
Id.
125
Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530, 538 (2014) (citing DeFillippo, 443 U.S. at 37).
126
DeFillippo, 443 U.S. at 37. In the Heien decision, the Court compared the situation in
DeFillippo with that of Heien by emphasizing the fact that “[t]he officers were wrong in concluding
that DeFillippo was guilty of a criminal offense . . . [in that] DeFillipo’s conduct was lawful when the
officers observed it”—since the law was eventually declared unconstitutional. Heien, 135 S. Ct. at 538.
However, as the dissent points out, unlike in DeFillippo—where the police officer correctly applied the
law that was then in existence, “police stopped Heien on suspicion of committing an offense that never
actually existed.” Id. at 546 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (noting that “it would have been wrong for [the]
officer [in DeFillippo] not to enforce the law in that situation); see DeFillippo, 443 U.S. at 38 (“Society
would be ill-served if its police officers took it upon themselves to determine which laws are and which
are not constitutionally entitled to enforcement.”).
127
Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949) (“Because many situations which confront
officers in the course of executing their duties are more or less ambiguous, room must be allowed for
some mistakes on their part.”).
128
Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 695–96 (1996).
129
Consultations in any form take time, which officers may not always have, especially in
situations that call for an immediate response. Further, officers may be unaware that a law is unsettled
or ambiguous until the case is brought to court.
130
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 10, 20 (1968).
124
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officers “on the scene.” Contrary to Heien’s argument, police discretion
plays a crucial role in our justice system. Society benefits from the
humanization of law enforcement. When investigating potentially unlawful
conduct, police officers can take into account circumstances that the
legislature may not have considered when drafting the relevant statute.132
Affording police greater discretion promotes fairness by allowing officers
to make ad hoc decisions based on the actual situation in front of them.
While investigatory traffic stops may not present the same urgency as
other police encounters, they are essential to law enforcement. Permitting
officers to stop vehicles for minor traffic violations keeps the roadways
safe and provides police with invaluable opportunities to thwart more
serious criminal activity. For example, in July of this year, a serial bank
robber was captured after a police officer stopped him for a broken tail
light.133 While the occasional reasonable mistake of law may lead to the
inconvenience of a few innocent drivers, society benefits substantially
from the reduction of crime in general.
But are traffic stops really just an “inconvenience?” As Justice
Sotomayor noted in her dissent, traffic stops can be “annoying, frightening,
and perhaps humiliating.”134 Nonetheless, courts afford a certain amount of
flexibility when it comes to fact assessments made by police officers
because of the need for on-the-fly decisions.135 Officers are better trained
and better positioned than courts to make those quick, ad hoc judgments.136
The reasonableness of factual determinations rests on the facts as they are
known to the officers as well as inferences and deductions drawn by those
officers.137 However, there are fundamental doctrinal and practical
differences between law and facts.138 Unlike factual determinations, legal
determinations need not—and should not—be made on an impromptu

131
Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 205 (2001); cf. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922 n.23
(1984) (noting that public officials enjoy qualified immunity in suits seeking damages for deprivations
of constitutional rights).
132
See Harold E. Pepinsky, Better Living Through Police Discretion, 47 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 249, 265 (1984) (“Application of rules requires (a) that inferences be drawn from information
received (e.g., as to whether complainants are telling the truth), and (b) that the rules be interpreted in
light of unforeseeable ambiguities presented by idiosyncratic encounters.”).
133
Neil Remiesiewicz, Police Hunch Leads to Arrest in Pair of Bank Robberies, WPRI
EYEWITNESS NEWS (July 12, 2014, 12:37 PM), http://wpri.com/2014/07/12/police-investigating-pairof-bank-robberies/.
134
Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530, 543 (2014) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (quoting
Terry, 392 U.S. at 25).
135
Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949).
136
Heien, 135 S. Ct. at 543 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“When officers evaluate unfolding
circumstances, they deploy that expertise to draw ‘conclusions about human behavior’ much in the way
that ‘jurors [do] as factfinders.’”) (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981)).
137
Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696 (1996).
138
Brief for Petitioner, supra note 37, at 19–22.
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basis. As the dissenting judge in the North Carolina Supreme Court
decision explained, “[i]t is the legislature’s job to write the law . . . . The
job of the police is to enforce the law as it has been written by the
legislature and interpreted by the courts.”140 In any given encounter, the
facts may change, but the law remains the same. In fact, “‘the notion that
the law is definite and knowable’ sits at the foundation of our legal
system.”141
The Supreme Court has held that the determination of reasonable
suspicion is a combination of law and fact. Specifically, “[t]he historical
facts are admitted or established, the rule of law is undisputed, and the
issue is whether the facts satisfy the [relevant] statutory [or constitutional]
standard.”142 To gauge the reasonableness of a search or seizure, the facts
surrounding the Fourth Amendment encounter must be measured against
the relevant law. Practically speaking, it is impossible to weigh the facts
ascertained by the police officer against the pertinent legal standard if the
pertinent legal standard is not interpreted accurately. As such, the Court’s
method of determining reasonable suspicion does not allow for mistakes of
law.
Of course, distinguishing between mistakes of fact and mistakes of law
is not always easy. What constitutes a mistake of fact versus a mistake of
law is often difficult to identify, especially when the distinction must be
made in the field. For instance, suppose a statute forbids “excessively
cracked windshields” and an officer stops a vehicle with what he thinks is
a seven-to-ten inch crack in the windshield.143 If it is determined that the
seven-to-ten inch crack did not violate the statute, did the officer make a
mistake of fact or a mistake of law? Should the distinction (if one exists)
matter—so long as the officer’s actions were reasonable? Based on the
Supreme Court’s decision in Heien, the answer is “no.” But why?
139

The majority opinion, however, concluded otherwise.
[A]n officer may ‘suddenly confront’ a situation in the field as to which the
application of a statute is unclear—however clear it may later become. A law
prohibiting ‘vehicles’ in the park either covers Segways or not, . . . but an officer
will nevertheless have to make a quick decision on the law the first time one
whizzes by.

Heien, 135 S. Ct. at 539 (citation omitted).
140
Heien II, 737 S.E.2d 351, 362 (N.C. 2012)(Hudson, J., dissenting); see Heien, 135 S. Ct. at
543 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“[I]t is courts, not officers, that are in the best position to interpret the
laws.”).
141
Heien, 135 S. Ct. at 543 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (quoting Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S.
192, 199 (1991).
142
Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 696 (emphasis added) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
143
See United States v. Cashman, 216 F.3d 582, 586–87 (7th Cir. 2000) (discussing an officer’s
interpretation of an excessively cracked windshield and whether it was correct).
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IV. THE DECISION
The question that faced the Supreme Court in Heien v. North Carolina
was whether a mistake of law could provide the requisite reasonable
suspicion to justify a traffic stop.144 The majority opinion, however, recast
the issue as “whether reasonable suspicion can rest on a mistaken
understanding of the scope of a legal prohibition.”145 While the Court’s
wording may just be semantics, it does suggest that it was looking for a
way to make the decision seem less ominous.146
Referencing the infamous Ginsburg quote,147 the Court declared, “[t]o
be reasonable is not to be perfect, and so the Fourth Amendment allows for
some mistakes on the part of government officials, giving them ‘fair
leeway for enforcing the law in the community’s protection.’”148 It cited
several situations where searches or seizures were found to be reasonable
despite being based on mistakes of fact.149 Recognizing that “reasonable
men make mistakes of law, too,”150 the Court determined that mistakes of
law should be given the same treatment as those of fact.151 Specifically, the
Court reasoned that “[w]hether the facts turn out to be not what was
thought, or the law turns out to be not what was thought, the result is the
same: the facts are outside the scope of the law.”152
While that reasoning is sound, it ignores the fundamental concerns
raised by Heien and the dissent. Even if the result of the two mistakes is
the same, facts and law are not the same. While there is not much an
innocent citizen can do about an officer’s mistaken interpretation of facts,
he should be able to avoid a negative encounter with law enforcement by
144

Heien, 135 S. Ct. at 534.
Id. at 536 (emphasis added).
146
The Court seemed to be emphasizing that the officer merely got the “scope” of the law wrong
rather than making up the law completely. While that is true in this case, it may not always be.
147
“The ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is ‘reasonableness.’” Id. (quoting Riley v.
California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2482 (2014) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
148
Heien, 135 S. Ct. at 536 (citing Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949)).
149
Id. (“The warrantless search of a home . . . is reasonable if undertaken with the consent of a
resident, and remains lawful when officers obtain the consent of someone who reasonably appears to be
but is not in fact a resident. . . . By the same token, if officers with probable cause to arrest a suspect
mistakenly arrest an individual matching the suspect’s description, neither the seizure nor an
accompanying search of the arrestee would be unlawful.”) (citation omitted).
150
Id.
151
The majority opinion actually did cite some older cases where courts found that mistakes of
law could provide “reasonable cause” (a synonym for probable cause). Specifically, the Court relied on
United States v. Riddle, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 311 (1809). In that case, goods were seized from an English
shipper on the ground that it had violated the customs laws by undervaluing the merchandise on an
invoice. Id. Chief Justice Marshall upheld the seizure even after concluding that there had been no
violation of the customs law because “the construction of the law was liable to some question.” Id. at
313 (“A doubt as to the true construction of the law is as reasonable a cause for seizure as a doubt
respecting the fact.”).
152
Heien, 135 S. Ct. at 536.
145
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proactively following the law. As Justice Sotomayor recognized, under the
majority’s opinion, “[o]ne wonders how a citizen seeking to be lawabiding and to structure his or her behavior to avoid these invasive,
frightening, and humiliating encounters could do so.”153 Civilians would be
left with the impossible task of predicting and abiding by every
misinterpretation of every traffic law, which may or may not exist, to avoid
being pulled over, which the Court has recognized is a substantial
infringement on an individual’s liberty.154
This reality presents a litany of questions. Is it reasonable for an officer
to rely on a misprint of a statute? Or on a statute that was already declared
unconstitutional? Does it matter how long it has been unconstitutional? A
month? A year? Is it reasonable to assume a particular law exists when it in
fact does not? What if a similar law exists? How similar must it be?155
“Giving officers license to effect seizures so long as they can attach to
their reasonable view of the facts some reasonable legal interpretation (or
misinterpretation) that suggests a law has been violated significantly
expands [their] authority”156 and discourages officers from learning the
law.157 Without some retroactive check on police conduct, there is “little
incentive to err on the side of constitutional behavior.”158 “Official
awareness of the dubious constitutionality of a practice would be
counterbalanced by official certainty that, so long as the Fourth
Amendment law in the area remained unsettled, evidence obtained through
the questionable practice would be excluded only in the one case
definitively resolving the unsettled question.”159
If courts allow mistakes of law, officers will likely choose to stop
drivers even in situations where they are unsure that a law actually
prohibits the drivers’ conduct, on the off chance that some statute can later
be mistakenly construed to sanction the stop. While this may not seem
outrageous in the instance of Sergeant Darisse’s “reasonable” belief that
the law required two functioning brake lights, it will set a precedent that
will encourage officers to broadly interpret the traffic code to the extent
153

Id. at 544 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 817 (1996) (noting that “even ordinary traffic stops
entail a possibly unsettling show of authority; . . . interfere with freedom of movement, are
inconvenient, and consume time[;] and . . . may create substantial anxiety” (citations omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
155
See Heien II, 737 S.E.2d 351, 360 (N.C. 2012) (Hudson, J., dissenting) (recognizing the danger
in adopting this rule as it will extend to cases where “the officer acts based on a misreading of a less
innocuous statute, or an innocent memo or training program from the police department, or his or her
previous law enforcement experience in a different state, or his or her belief in a nonexistent law”).
156
Heien, 135 S. Ct. at 543 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
157
Brief for Petitioner, supra note 37, at 35–36.
158
Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2435 (2011) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (citation
omitted).
159
United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 561 (1982).
154
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that any “reasonable” reading of any law—even if incorrect—could justify
reasonable suspicion.160
The majority opinion claims that the decision “does not discourage
officers from learning the law [because] . . . . [t]he Fourth Amendment
tolerates only reasonable mistakes, and those mistakes—whether of fact or
of law—must be objectively reasonable.”161 Indeed, there is no question
that it is unreasonable for officers to be completely ignorant of the laws
that they enforce. However, when an officer reasonably interprets an
unsettled law, the search or seizure may be lawful. In these cases, officers
are aware of the law and believe that their enforcement is authorized. The
complicated or ambiguous nature of the law is what makes the officer’s
actions reasonable.162 In cases where an officer is truly ignorant of a settled
law, the search or seizure would be deemed unreasonable and therefore a
violation of the Fourth Amendment.
Ultimately, the majority agreed with North Carolina, holding that
reasonable “mistake[s] of law . . . can give rise to the reasonable suspicion
necessary to uphold the seizure under the Fourth Amendment.”163 Thus,
because Sergeant Darisse’s mistake was reasonable, the stop was lawful.164

160
See Barlow v. United States, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 404, 411 (1833) (Story, J.) (“There is scarcely
any law which does not admit of some ingenious doubt. . . .”).
161
Heien, 135 S. Ct. at 539.
162
Id. at 541 (Kagan, J., concurring) (“If the statute is genuinely ambiguous, such that overturning
the officer’s judgment requires hard interpretive work, then the officer has made a reasonable mistake.
But if not, not.”).
163
Id. at 534 (majority opinion).
164
Id. at 540. The Court concluded that the conflicting language of the North Carolina statute
made it reasonable for Officer Darisse to conclude that the faulty brake light was a violation of North
Carolina law. Id. Specifically, it explained:

Although the North Carolina statute at issue refers to “a stop lamp,” suggesting the
need for only a single working brake light, it also provides that “[t]he stop lamp may
be incorporated into a unit with one or more other rear lamps.” The use of “other”
suggests to the everyday reader of English that a “stop lamp” is a type of “rear
lamp.” And another subsection of the same provision requires that vehicles “have all
originally equipped rear lamps or the equivalent in good working order,” arguably
indicating that if a vehicle has multiple “stop lamp[s],” all must be functional. . . .
[Since] the “rear lamps” discussed in subsection (d) do not include brake lights, but,
given the “other,” it would at least have been reasonable to think they did.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
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V. RENEWING WHREN: “DRIVING WHILE BLACK” AFTER HEIEN
While North Carolina conceded that cases in which a mistake could be
excused (like Sergeant Darisse’s) would be “exceedingly rare,”165 how
often would a mistake even be presented for review? It is not the
occasional individual injustice due to a mistake of law that is troubling. It
is the overall effect of the outright expansion of police discretion. Justice
Sotomayor voiced this concern in her dissent, contending that the
majority’s decision “further erod[es] the Fourth Amendment’s protection
of civil liberties in a context where that protection has already been worn
down.”166
There is no dispute that minority drivers are more likely to be stopped
on a roadway than Caucasian drivers.167 Due to “the so-called war on
drugs,” racial profiling has been a very real issue for decades.168 A few
years ago rapper Jay-Z memorialized this harsh reality in his song, “99
Problems.”169 In the song, Jay-Z is pulled over on the New Jersey Turnpike
and the officer asks “Son do you know why I’m stopping you for?”170 To
which Jay-Z answered, “Cause I’m young and I’m black and my hat’s real
low.”171 Truth be told, Jay-Z was probably right. According to a study of
the New Jersey Turnpike during the 1990s (around the time that the stop in
the song occurred), “African-American motorists made up 35% of all
traffic stops and 73% of all arrests, even though they represented only an
estimated 13% of drivers.”172 Additionally, black drivers are searched
165

Id. at 541 (Kagan, J., concurring) (citing Brief for the Respondent, supra note 80, at 17).
Id. at 543 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
167
Especially in North Carolina. See Jim Wise, Durham Study Supports Traffic-Stop Disparity
Claims, DURHAM NEWS (Sept. 26, 2013), www.thedurhamnews.com/ 2013/09/26/ 3230249_durhamnumbers-support-traffic.html (“[T]he numbers show that a black or Hispanic motorist is 77 percent
more likely to be searched after a traffic stop than a white driver.”).
168
See David A. Harris, Driving While Black: Racial Profiling On Our Nation’s Highways,
ACLU: SPECIAL REPORT, June 7, 1999, available at https://www.aclu.org/racial-justice/driving-whileblack-racial-profiling-our-nations-highways (explaining that racial profiling became especially
prevalent in the 1980s due to the so-called “war on drugs”).
169
JAY-Z, 99 PROBLEMS (Roc-A-Fella/Def Jam 2004).
170
Id.
171
Id. While Jay-Z’s words may be true, they are also part of the problem because they reinforce
the stigma. Racial profiling is the result of self-perpetuating racial inequality. Glenn Loury, an
economist and author of The Anatomy of Racial Inequality, puts the problem in the context of taxi
drivers. Loury proposes a hypothetical in which taxi drivers do not stop for blacks because blacks are
robbers. GLENN C. LOURY, THE ANATOMY OF RACIAL INEQUALITY 30–31 (2002). Blacks know that
drivers are unlikely to stop for them. Id. So only black robbers (who do not mind waiting since they
plan on robbing whoever stops anyway) take taxis. Id. This reinforces the driver’s belief since it is now
more likely that a black rider is a robber. Id. Ironically, Chris Rock’s latest movie includes a scene
where the main character, a black man, tries to prove to his friend that cabs never stop for black men.
TOP FIVE (Paramount Pictures 2014). But as soon as he raises his hand, a cab immediately pulls up next
to him. Id.
172
Kimberly D. Dodson & Randal Sluss, Police Practices of the North Carolina Highway Patrol:
Do Police Target Minorities?, 10 L. ENFORCEMENT EXECUTIVE F. 55, 56 (2010), available at
166
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173

twice as often as white drivers after being stopped.
This disparity in traffic stop statistics among races is unsurprising,
especially in light of the Supreme Court’s holding in Whren v. United
States.174 In Whren, the Court explicitly sanctioned pretextual traffic stops,
holding that an officer’s discriminatory motivations for pulling over a
vehicle are irrelevant for the purposes of the Fourth Amendment.175
Specifically, the Court made it clear that “[s]ubjective intentions play no
role” in the evaluation of the legality of a traffic stop.176 It held that, despite
the potentially unconstitutional intentions of the officer, there was no
Fourth Amendment violation because the officer had probable cause to
believe that the driver had violated the traffic code.177
However, the Court assumed in Whren that “when an officer acts on
pretext, at least that pretext would be the violation of an actual law.”178 In
United States v. Chanthasouxat,179 the Eleventh Circuit explained the
effect of the Whren Court’s decision on Fourth Amendment jurisprudence:
“The rule [set out] in Whren provides law enforcement officers broad
leeway to conduct searches and seizures regardless of whether their
subjective intent corresponds to the legal justifications for their actions.
But the flip side of that leeway is that the legal justifications must be
objectively grounded.”180 Thus—after Whren—police discretion to stop
and search was at least limited to situations where an actual violation of the
law occurred. Now—after Heien—the Supreme Court has essentially given
police officers permission to hide their impermissible motives behind
artificial legal justifications in addition to false factual determinations.
Undeniably, individuals who believe they have been discriminated
against have the right to sue under the Equal Protection Clause.181
However, having the right to bring an equal protection claim and the
ability to bring one are not the same. In order to bring an equal protection
claim against a police officer, the individual must prove that the officer
http://www.academia.edu/4022380/Police_Practices_of_the_North_Carolina
_Highway_Patrol_Do_Police_Target_Minorities (last visited Jan. 17, 2015).
173
Wise, supra note 167.
174
517 U.S. 806 (1996).
175
Id. at 818–19.
176
Id. at 813.
177
Id. at 818; Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1416 (2013) (“[A] stop or search that is
objectively reasonable is not vitiated by the fact that the officer’s real reason for making the stop or
search has nothing to do with the validating reason.” (emphasis omitted)).
178
Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530, 543 (2014) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (emphasis
added); see Whren, 517 U.S. at 818 (noting that the “infraction itself [is] . . . the ordinary measure of
the lawfulness of enforcement”).
179
342 F.3d 1271 (11th Cir. 2003).
180
Id. at 1279 (emphasis added).
181
Whren, 517 U.S. at 813 (“[T]he constitutional basis for objecting to intentionally
discriminatory application of laws is the Equal Protection Clause.”).
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intentionally discriminated against him based on race, or some other
protected status.182 In other words, the claimant must prove that a similarly
situated individual (of a different race, etc.) would have been stopped for
the same traffic offense but was not.183 This is particularly difficult
considering officers tend to keep records only of drivers they stopped, not
of those they chose not to.184 Without the ability to look inside the mind of
the officer involved, it is nearly impossible to prove discriminatory
intent.185 Even if the claimant is able to establish a constitutional violation,
the officer may be entitled to qualified immunity.186
Ironically, the majority opinion in Heien emphasized that the inquiry
into whether an officer’s mistake of law is objectively reasonable “is not as
forgiving as the one employed in the distinct context of deciding whether
an officer is entitled to qualified immunity for a constitutional or statutory
violation.”187 Apparently, an innocent individual, who is mistakenly
stopped and wants to allege discrimination by the officer, is faced with a
higher burden of proof than a criminal who merely wants evidence
suppressed. Given the higher burden of proof and the time and money it
takes to bring a civil action, the only individuals who could fight back
against racial discrimination by police officers are arguably “bad guys.”
And because the defendants are “bad guys” and police officers are now
(thanks to Heien) permitted to stop vehicles for any (reasonable) reason,
judges will more than likely absolve the officer from blame, perpetuating
the problem.188
The Heien court’s decision to allow mistakes of law to justify
182
Kenneth Gavsie, Making the Best of “Whren”: The Problems with Pretextual Traffic Stops
and the Need for Restraint, 50 FLA. L. REV. 385, 393 (1998).
183
Id. (“[A]n African-American motorist would have to show that a white motorist was observed
by an officer committing the same violation under similar circumstances, yet was not stopped.”).
184
Id.; see Wise, supra note 167 (noting that North Carolina was one of the first states to enact
legislation that requires law enforcement agencies to collect and report racial and ethnic data for traffic
stops).
185
See Gavsie, supra note 182, at 393–94 (noting that “short of an officer admitting he stopped a
driver because of race, raising a successful equal protection challenge will be a near impossibility”).
186
Kit Kinports, Qualified Immunity in Section 1983 Cases: The Unanswered Questions, 23 GA.
L. REV. 597, 600–01 (1989).
187
Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530, 539 (2014); see Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074,
2085 (2011) (“Qualified immunity gives government officials breathing room to make reasonable but
mistaken judgments about open legal questions.”).
188
With the help of the judiciary, racial profiling has become “a self-fulfilling prophecy.” Harris,
supra note 168.

Because police look for drugs primarily among African Americans and Latinos, they
find a disproportionate number of them with contraband. Therefore, more minorities
are arrested, prosecuted, convicted, and jailed, thus reinforcing the perception that
drug trafficking is primarily a minority activity. This perception creates the profile
that results in more stops of minority drivers. . . . And so the cycle continues.
Id.
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reasonable suspicion essentially gives officers carte blanche to stop
individuals based on whatever subjective criteria they see fit, promoting
racial profiling and further increasing the distrust of law enforcement
officers among minorities. In “99 Problems,” Jay-Z was describing the
conditions on the New Jersey Turnpike in 1994 (two years before the
Whren decision).189 Nearly twenty years later, the Supreme Court seems to
be moving in the wrong direction.
Racial profiling has arguably escalated from being an inconvenience
for black drivers to a death sentence. Indeed, according to a report issued
by the Justice Department investigating law enforcement practices in
Ferguson, Missouri, racial bias and stereotyping “severely damaged the
relationship between African Americans and the Ferguson Police
Department long before Michael Brown’s shooting death in August
2014.”190 The report “give[s] the context for the shooting, describing the
mounting sense of frustration and anger in a predominantly black city
where the police department and local government are mostly white.”191
Specifically, the Justice Department accused the Ferguson Police
Department of engaging in a pattern of discriminatory stops and arrests of
African Americans without reasonable suspicion or probable cause and
then relying on fines for missed court appearances and traffic tickets to
balance the city’s budget.192 The report concluded that these unlawful
practices “are directly shaped and perpetuated by racial bias.”193 According
to the New York Times, the Ferguson report is “the last in a long string of
civil rights investigations into police departments” since 2009.194 In light of
this climate, it is a bit disheartening that the Court made no effort to
address the racial implications of its decision in Heien.195
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JAY-Z, DECODED 207 (2010).
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON POLICE DEPARTMENT 79 (2015)
[hereinafter FERGUSON REPORT].
191
Matt Apuzzo, Justice Report to Fault Bias by Ferguson, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 2015, at A1
(citing to “several officials who have been briefed on the report’s conclusions.”).
192
FERGUSON REPORT, supra note 190, at 2–4. For example, from 2012 to 2014 “African
Americans account for 85% of vehicle stops, 90% of citations and 93% of arrests made by [Ferguson
Police Department] officers, despite comprising only 67% of Ferguson’s population.” Id. at 4.
193
Id. 4–5 (“Our investigation indicates that this disproportionate burden on African Americans
cannot be explained by any difference in the rate at which people of different races violate the law.
Rather, our investigation has revealed that theses disparities occur, at least in part, because of unlawful
bias against and stereotypes about African Americans.”).
194
Apuzzo, supra note 191.
195
However, Justice Sotomayor in her dissent did mention the “human consequences—including
those for communities and for their relationships with the police.” Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct.
530, 544 (2014) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
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VI. CONCLUSION
There is no question that the failed indictments of the officers in
Ferguson and Staten Island have revived the debate over racial
discrimination by law enforcement. Handed down just weeks later, the
Heien decision will add fuel to the fire. After Heien, officers will be
permitted to conduct searches and seizures so long as they can cite some
reasonable legal interpretation (or misinterpretation) that suggests that a
law has been broken. This expansion of police authority will
disproportionately affect minorities, who are already singled out by law
enforcement. While the Court is confident that very few mistakes of law
will ultimately be upheld, “the Court’s unwillingness to sketch a fuller
view of what makes a mistake of law reasonable only presages the likely
difficulty that courts will have applying the Court’s decision.”196 For the
time being, it seems as if we are left with no answer to the ominous
question, “do you know why I stopped you?”

196

Id. at 547.

